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Abstract
We propose to perform quantum key distribution using quantum correlations occurring within
thermal states produced by low power sources such as LEDs. These correlations are exploited
through the Hanbury Brown and Twiss effect. We build an optical central broadcast protocol using
a superluminescent diode which allows switching between laser and thermal regimes, enabling us
to provide comparable experimental key rates in both regimes. We provide a theoretical analysis
and show that quantum secrecy is possible, even in high noise situations.
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PRELUDE
In 2016, China launched what Gibney dubbed the first quantum satellite [1], the intent
of which is to perform quantum key distribution between the satellite and ground stations,
see for instance [2]. This is just one of the current practical schemes designed to perform
quantum secure key distribution and communication between parties; other examples include
the DARPA network [3], the SECOQC project [4], or the Durban-QuantumCity project
[5, 6], which use fibre-optic technologies to build quantum networks. These technologies rely
on optical communication setups that were proven to be sufficient for performing quantum
key distribution (QKD) [7]. Optical setups commonly work over great distances and achieve
high bit rate; for instance, the Cambridge Quantum Network achieves a secure key rate of
about 2.5Mb/s [8, 9]. Such heavy duty infrastructure is, however, impractical for a plethora
of short distance applications which nonetheless require high levels of encryption. Examples
include key distribution and renewal between a mobile device and a medical implant, between
an electronic car key and its lock or even between a mobile device and a password blackbox.
These low power applications may need shorter key, lower bandwidth and as a result, an
infrastructure built on high power lasers, single photons or entangled photons sources, may
well be unsuitable. Reducing light source requirements to LEDs producing thermal states
would allow us to explore the realm of low power applications and to appeal to a different
set of customers.
The consideration of thermal states as a resource for QKD is not merely a technological
preference, quite far from it. Thermal radiation is bunched, meaning that its quanta are
likely to be detected in correlated pairs. These correlations produce quantum discord, as
demonstrated by Ragy and Adesso using the Re´nyi entropy [10]. Furthermore, Pirandola
[11] establishes theoretically that non-zero quantum discord is necessary for QKD, and that
positive discord in a central broadcast-type protocol allows a quantum secure key to be
extracted even with high levels of noise. Indeed, quantum discord has been established as a
measure of quantum correlations [12]. Correlations can be qualified using the second-order
correlation coefficient, generally known as g(2)(τ), defined as
g(2)(τ) =
〈Y (t)Y (t+ τ)〉
〈Y (t)〉 〈Y (t+ τ)〉 ,
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where Y (t) is the radiation intensity. Radiation can then be characterised using g(2) as: anti-
bunched (purely non classical) when g(2)(0) < 1, coherent when g(2)(0) = 1, and bunched
when g(2)(0) > 1 [13]. We use this classification in order to experimentally verify that we
are operating in the thermal regime, as can be seen later in Figure ??.
To exploit the correlations within bunched pairs requires the photon pairs to be separated
and shared between two parties (e.g. Alice and Bob); this is done using the Hanbury Brown
and Twiss (HBT) interferometer [14, 15], designed in the 50’s to remedy the shortcomings of
amplitude interferometers, such as the Michelson interferometer [16, 17], used in astronomy
to determine the radius of stellar objects. The HBT’s table-top set-up is simple: a source
shines onto a beamsplitter, creating two arms, each shining onto a separate detector. The
theory behind the observed interference effect has been studied by a number of authors,
amongst the first Purcell [18] and Mandel [19, 20], whose papers provide a nicely intuitive
pre quantum optical description (see [21]) of the statistics.
Mandel’s analysis relies on the fact that what we count are not the photons themselves,
but the photoelectrons ejected by the detector. Fluctuations in that number have two origins:
very fast fluctuations in the intensity of the incoming signal, and the stochasticity of the
reaction of the photo-sensitive material to its interaction with the radiation field (namely
the ejection of a photoelectron). However, the detector is also fundamentally limited by its
reaction time (or bandwidth) and therefore, very fast fluctuations may occur undetected.
Yet, if these fluctuations are invisible, the correlations between them are not; in the original
experiment and in current radio astronomy, the data used for calculations is often data
which has been fed through a correlator (either hardware or software).
The production of photoelectrons is completely characterised by its average number nT
and several experiments have been performed to estimate it, such as [22–24]. These photon-
counting experiments highlight that the bandwidth of the detector relates to the coherence
time τc of the source, and that when the observation time T  τc, nT follows a Bose-
Einstein distribution. This is in fact how thermal states are usually modelled in quantum
optics, especially since this distribution naturally arises through the modelling of blackbody
radiation. However, the distribution is also generally used without acknowledgments of its
caveats. If the source’s coherence time is suitably long (i.e. the source has a linewidth
in the order of kHz), then a detector bandwidth in GHz will allow for the use of the Bose-
Einstein distribution, and the resolving of thermal behaviour. However, if the laser linewidth
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approaches 1Hz, a GHz bandwidth is simply too wide to observe thermal behaviour; all the
relevant correlations will be lost. Such a caveat was neglected in articles such as [25] and
contributes to limited conclusions.
A natural objection to the use of thermal states for quantum cryptography is the life-
time of the correlations, perhaps in light of the fragility of entanglement. However, current
common implementations include very large telescope arrays such as VLA, ATCA or soon
the SKA; another famous usage is the observation of the cosmic microwave background.
Furthermore, the original HBT experiment was performed in the optical regime. In either
regime, the correlations literally survive astronomical distances in free space. The use of
thermal states therefore, naturally emerges as a potential partner to optical QKD tech-
niques, especially with the rise of technologies such as WiFi and Bluetooth, which offer
ever-increasing possibilities, such as through wall or medium range free space communica-
tions. Furthermore, we will show in the following, that in either the optical or the microwave
regime, the protocol described below is quantum secure.
Next we describe the protocol we propose. We continue with a discussion of the eaves-
dropper (Eve), which will naturally lead us to analysing the security of the protocol and its
theoretical modelling. As such, we show experimental results, as well as further theoretical
discussions, including on the issue of detector noise.
PROTOCOL
We propose a central broadcast protocol, reminiscent of Maurer and Wolf’s scenario 1 in
[26], shown on Figure 1. It is described as follows :
• Alice creates a beam from a trusted thermal source.
• They then use a trusted beamsplitter with transmittance η1 to divert and detect part
of the transmission and send the rest on to Bob (Eve).
• The bunched nature of a thermal source means that fluctuations present at Alice’s
detector are correlated with those at Bob’s detector.
• These fluctuations can be sliced into bits any number of ways, but with no loss of
generality, we assume here that a fluctuation above the signal mean is a 1 and one
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FIG. 1: (Colour online) Schematic of the protocol. Even though Alice controls the source,
this is a central broadcast because the signal is split between Alice and Bob. Alice does
not prepare their state.
FIG. 2: (Colour online) Diagram of the experimental set-up. Thermal or coherent light is
produced at the source. The combination of half wave plate (
λ
2
) and polarising beam
splitter (PBS) acts as a controllable beam splitter, allowing a controlled amount of light
through. This first combination acts as η1, directing part of the beam to Alice, and the
second combination acts as η2, directing a further part of the beam to Eve.
below the mean is a 0.
• In order to detect an eavesdropper, Alice sends small random chunks of data to Bob
who performs a g(2) calculation to verify thermality.
• Alice and Bob now have a stream of independent and randomly correlated bits from
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which they can derive a key, the security of which they can improve with Cascade and
Advantage Distillation, as per any QKD scheme.
This scheme was implemented as shown on Figure 2. In order to simulate high levels of noise,
we consider an attenuator channel between η2 and Bob, equivalent to adding a beamsplitter
of transmittance η4 between η2 and Bob, with a input state of variance N at the second
input arm.
Let us emphasise that this is not a prepare-and-send scheme, but instead relies on central
broadcasting. This means that although we assume that Alice controls the source, they do
not in fact, prepare their states.
Even if Eve interferes with the signal on its way to Bob via the most powerful attack
available, we assume that she has no control over any part of Alice’s apparatus, including
the source, the beamsplitter (η1) or the detector. Similarly, she has no control over Bob’s
detector.
The security of this protocol arises from the quantum correlations within the thermal
fluctuations, those responsible for the Hanbury Brown and Twiss effect. Upon arrival at η1
from the source, a bunched pair will either travel whole to Alice, travel whole onwards to
face η2 or split between Alice and η2. Any pair travelling onwards to η2 (and then η4) will
suffer the same fate, but the pairs we can exploit are those splitting between Alice and either
Bob or Eve. Using the quantum correlations within the pairs is what allows us to cascade
the beamsplitters this way, however, at the cost of photons pairs, and so of correlations. For
instance, when η1 is at 50%, half the light goes to Alice, the rest is to be shared between
Eve and Bob. If η2 is also at 50%, only a quarter of the original source signal is available to
Bob (provided full transmission at η4).
To model our protocol, we must know how to model Eve and for that, we must under-
stand what actions she can take. Alice controls everything, from the source to their detector,
including η1. This means that the only place for Eve to “insert” herself is on Bob’s branch
of the distribution, much like on most current prepare-and-send QKD schemes.
By current standards, the most powerful attack at Eve’s disposal is a collective Gaussian
attack. This is typically modelled by Eve mixing one mode out of an EPR sate with
Bob’s signal and recording the outcome for measurement upon Alice and Bob’s classical
communication [27]. As such, it is the attack modelled in this paper.
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However, it is doubtful that Eve can, in fact, obtain any relevant information in a cen-
tral broadcast scheme (CBS). The reason for that lies in the physics of the correlations
themselves.
One conceivable attack would be for Eve to measure the signal going to Bob and reproduce
it. We rely on bunched pairs, correlated via second-order temporal coherence. Should Eve be
able to measure and reproduce Bob’s photons fast enough, what prevents her from escaping
detection?
The operative words in that sentence are “fast enough”. Eve cannot beat Heisenberg’s
uncertainty principle, which limits her ability to detect and recreate withing a specific time,
which is the signal coherence time τc. In the case of our experiment, τc = 1µs. Correlations
in bunched pairs exist only for detection during that time. Simply applying Heisenberg’s
uncertainty principle, setting ∆t = τc/2, yields ∆E ≥ 6.6 · 10−10eV for a photon of energy
E = 1.59eV . This is the maximum uncertainty which Eve is allowed for detecting and
recreating the photon, to have a chance at fooling Alice and Bob by making Bob’s detector
click within the allotted time. This uncertainty does not of course, account for shot noise,
and Eve can only allow for detection and/or preparation noise within the ∆E margin.
Vacuum energy here is E0 =
1
2
~c/λ ≈ 0.13eV ; this means that a single inescapable unit of
shot noise is enough to push Eve past her limit.
This is a very crude argument, but it demonstrates that a simple intercept-and-resend
scenario is useless. Actually, as we have explained before, Eve gains very little in using even
an entangling cloner, because of the probabilistic ways that the photon pairs will split at η1
then at η2.
MODELLING
Thermal states are Gaussian states; these states can be easily defined and manipulated
through their first and second moments [28, 29]. The former are contained in the displace-
ment vector 〈rˆ〉, where rˆ is the system’s operator, and ρ the state’s density operator. The
second moments are contained in the covariance matrix γ defined as
γij = Tr [ρ {(rˆi − 〈rˆi〉), (rˆj − 〈rˆj〉)} ρ] ,
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where we write the anti-commutator using {}.
A thermal state has covariance matrix γin = 2(n¯ + 1)I, where n¯ is the average photon
number and I the identity matrix, and null displacement. We consider in the present work,
a displaced thermal state, with covariance matrix as before, but with non-null displacement
(it can also be construed as a noisy coherent state).
We use the Bose Einstein distribution
n¯ =
1
e~ω/kBT − 1 , (1)
acknowledging all the caveats highlighted in the introduction, and consider narrowband
detectors measuring radiation at 30GHz and T = 300K, so that n¯ = 1309.
A beamsplitter is modelled as
V i =
 √ηiI µiI
−µiI √ηiI
 ,
where µi =
√
1− ηi represents the loss.
The input state at the first beamsplitter contains the thermal source and a vacuum state;
it has covariance matrix and operator vector
γin =
 V xs 0
0 V ps
⊕ I .
Since we give Eve an entangling cloner, she inputs one mode of her state at η2 so the
input state is of the form
γη2in = γ
η1
out
⊕ V xe 0
0 V pe
 .
In fact, Eve’s full input state can be written as
γeve =
 νI √ν2 − 1Z√
ν2 − 1Z νI
 ,
with Z the Pauli-Z matrix. However, only one mode of the EPR mixes with the legal signal
at η2. Since the rest of their state is unavailable to us, and of little practical value, we
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can trace it out for the sake of clarity. We can make further assumptions on Eve’s state;
she can be merely there and tap the channel, in which case, her inputs is one shot noise
unit Ve = 1SNU . If she inputs a state, the minimum variance she can get away with is
Ve = 2SNU , where 1SNU comes from her coherent state and the complementary 1SNU
through shot noise.
We make the channel between η2 and Bob a thermal noise channel by inputting a state
of variance
N =
η4χ
1− η4 , with χ =
1− η4
η4
+  ,
and  the channel excess noise [29]. The input state at η4 is
γη4int = γ
η2
out
⊕ N 0
0 N
 ,
where γη2out is the state at the output of η2 and N as defined previously.
The output covariance matrix is
Γout =

Γa Γea Γab Γan
Γea Γe Γeb Γen
Γab Γeb Γb Γbn
Γan Γen Γbn Γn

where the sub-matrices of interest are
Γa =
 µ21V xs + η1 0
0 µ21V
p
s + η1
 , Γe =
 µ22(η1V xs + µ21) + η2V xe 0
0 µ22(η1V
p
s + µ
2
1) + η2V
p
e
 ,
Γea =
 µ1√η1µ2(V xs − 1) 0
0 µ1
√
η1µ2(V
p
s − 1)
 ,
Γeb =
 −µ2√η2√η4(η1V xs + µ21 − V xe ) 0
0 −µ2√η2√η4(η1V ps + µ21 − V pe )
 ,
Γb =
 η4 (η2(η1V xs + µ21) + µ22V xe ) + µ24N 0
0 η4 (η2(η1V
p
s + µ
2
1) + µ
2
2V
p
e ) + µ
2
4N
 , (2)
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The remaining block sub-matrices are given in the Appendix.
The secrecy will be witnessed using the secret key rate K(A : B ‖ E), defined here in
terms of its lower bound as K(A : B ‖ E) = I(A : B) − χ(B : E), where χ(B : E) is the
Holevo bound, between Bob and Eve, which maximises their mutual information I(B : E).
We define the mutual information as
I(A : B) = S(Γa) + S(Γb)− S(Γab) ,
where S(Γ) is the Von Neumann entropy. The Von Neumann entropy S(ρ) = −Tr (ρ log ρ),
for a Gaussian state, is simply determined in terms of the symplectic eigenvalues xi of its
covariance matrix Γ [29], as S(Γ) =
∑k
i=1 g(xi), where
g(x) =
(
x+ 1
2
)
log
(
x+ 1
2
)
−
(
x− 1
2
)
log
(
x− 1
2
)
.
The correlation in the pairs shared between Alice and Bob is described with the quantum
discord, D(B|A), defined as the difference between the mutual information I(A : B) and
the classical mutual information J(B|A) (or J(A|B)). I(A : B) quantifies all possible cor-
relations between Alice and Bob, but J(B|A) quantifies those measured by local operations
at Alice’s and Bob’s sites. We define the discord D(B|A) as,
D(B|A) =S(Γa)− S(Γab) + min
Γ0
S(Γb|xA)
where Γb|xA = Γb − Γab(XΓaX)−1ΓTab
is the covariance matrix of B conditionned by a homodyne measurement on A [30], with
X =
 1 0
0 0
 and ()−1 the pseudo-inverse. We write the Holevo bound χ(B : E) as
χ(B : E) = S(Γe)− S(Γe|xb) ,
where we estimate Γe|xb as above, using the submatrices we have derived through our mod-
elling.
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RESULTS
The protocol was realised experimentally, using a tuneable laser consisting of a super-
luminescent diode and an external cavity. When run above the operating current, the laser
emitted non-thermal coherent light, and when run below this operating current, it acted
as a diode, producing thermal light. This effectively acts as a switch allowing the addi-
tion or removal of thermality in the source without altering any other part. We apply no
modulation to the signal beyond that of the source. Just as shown on Figure 2, the source
diode shines onto a variable beamsplitter. The various signals are detected by photodiodes
and the signals then fed to an oscilloscope. The superluminescent diode has a typical lasing
linewidth of 100kHz, the photodiodes’ bandwidth is 100MHz and the oscilloscope’s 150MHz.
This thermality is seen in Figures 3 and 4 where the second order correlations at each
regime are shown. We can easily see that
g(2)(0)|thermal > g(2)(0)|coherent ,
which we expected. Figure 4 shows that in the thermal regime, g(2)(0) > 1, which means
that we are dealing with bunched radiation, fluctuations and as a result, correlations. Due
to the relatively slow photodiode bandwidth in comparison to the linewidth of the laser, the
second order correlations observed will be considerably less than 2. We calculate them to be
of the order 1.0001 [31], which is in agreement with the experimental results. Furthermore,
we see that since g(2)|coherent ≈ 1, there are no correlations in coherent light because there
are no fluctuations, as we expect theoretically. Now that we have established that we have a
thermal source, we shine it through two variable beamsplitters, the first dividing a portion
to Alice, and the second splitting the remaining light between Eve and Bob.
We plot the secret key rate K ′(A : B ‖ E) = I(A : B)− I(B : E) in Figure 5.
The use of thermal light clearly provides a higher key rate than coherent light. The most
optimal regime is for Alice and Bob to both receive equal portions of light, so the key rate
peaks when η1 = 0.5. We note easily that K
′(A : B ‖ E) (which is a lower bound) is negative
when η1 → 1, so when no signal goes to Alice and as a result, they share no information
with Bob. Recall that Alice is in control of η1, and we assume that Eve cannot adversely
affect this beamsplitter. When η1 = 0.5, K
′(A : B ‖ E) decreases as η2 decreases (so when
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FIG. 3: (Colour online) Experimental results : second order correlation coefficient for
coherent states.
FIG. 4: (Colour online) Experimental results : second order correlation coefficient for
thermal states.
Eve gets more of the signal) but nonetheless, it remains positive, meaning that key exchange
is always possible, albeit with reduced rate in the high loss regimes. Furthermore, unlike
conventional continuous variable schemes, a central broadcast scheme has the advantage
that it does not exhibit a sharp drop off, so a secret key can always be produced.
As seen on Figure 6, the secret key rate is always positive, and so we conclude that there
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FIG. 5: (Colour online) Experimental results : secret key rate for coherent states (left)
versus thermal states (right). η1 is controlled by Alice; when η1 = 1, she has no signal and
therefore, the key rate becomes negative. Similarly, as η1 → 0, she gains the advantage
over Bob and Eve. As expected, the most advantageous value is when η1 = 0.5.
is always secrecy. It does, however, stagnate until η2 approaches unity, i.e. until Eve lets
most of the signal through. Key exchange is slow until Eve lets signal out; as a result,
Eve is easily detectable. Let us recall also, that K(A : B||E) is a lower bound; we can
therefore expect better key rates. The secret key rate improves if Eve inputs a coherent
state Ve = 2SNU , albeit marginally. This improvement is more pronounced if Eve inputs a
thermal state Ve = 5SNU .
A crossover is obvious on the figure; at η2 = 30% (so actually fairly low), Alice and Bob
lose out if Eve inputs anything. As η2 increases, Bob gets more and more of the signal;
as a result, Alice and Bob’s mutual information increases, and as can be seen on Figure 8,
I(A : B) increases faster than χ(B : E).
Figure 7 demonstrates the effect of the presence of Eve on the discord. Of highest
importance to us is that the discord is always positive. This means that the correlations
between Alice and Bob are always quantum, and as a result, so is our security. As the
transmittance η2 increases, Eve gets less and less signal, so naturally, the discord increases.
When Eve’s input is higher than 1SNU (so when she inputs a coherent state), the discord
gets worse, but not significantly.
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FIG. 6: (colour online) Secret key rate K(A : B||E), plotted against η2, for η4 = and
 = 10−2. The full line shows the secret key rate when the complementary input at η2 is a
vacuum state. The dashed-dotted line shows the secret key rate when Eve inputs a
coherent state; the dashed line, when Ve = 5SNU . Visibly, any input on the part of Eve
improves the key rate. As η2 approaches full transmission, the secret key rate increases
rapidly. The x-axis is cropped for readability.
Figure 8 shows how Eve’s input influences the amount of information she could gain, by
the input of a state such as defined previously. Contrary to what one might expect, coming
from a point-to-point prepare-and-send mindset, Eve does not gain much by inputting a
coherent state. The Holevo bounds χ(A : E) and χ(B : E) are worse for Ve = 2SNU than
they are for Ve = 1SNU (vacuum). This scheme relies on bunched radiation; Eve’s effect
is to destroys these pairs. As a result, she becomes (separately) correlated with Alice and
with Bob, which is what the Holevo bounds show. Her inputting a coherent state will not
provide her with any more information, since it will not increase her correlation with either
Alice nor Bob.
On Figure 8, we also explore briefly the influence of channel excess noise  (dashed lines).
We note that χ(A : E) is not affected by ; since the thermal noise channel is that which
separates Eve and Bob, Alice is not affected. This is not the case for I(A : B) and χ(B : E)
14
FIG. 7: (colour online) Discord D(B|A), plotted against η2, for η4 = −7dB and  = 10−2.
The full line shows the discord when the complementary input at η2 is a vacuum state.
The dashed-dotted line shows the discord when Eve inputs a coherent state; the dashed
line, when Ve = 5SNU . As η2 increases, so does the portion of the signal which goes to
Bob and therefore, so does the discord. A non-vacuum complementary input at η2 reduces
the discord as it interferes with the correlated signal which Bob shares with Alice.
which are both reduced by the channel excess noise. However, that reduction is insufficient
to cause the key rate great damage. It is reduced but not significantly enough to impede
key distribution.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The outcome of this analysis is that our scheme can always be considered quantum
secure, since both the secret key rate and the discord are positive. Furthermore, we have
shown that Eve’s input is merely a disturbance, not only to the legal parties but most
importantly to herself. This is simply a result of the physics; the thermal radiation is
correlated and since Eve can only place herself after it has been split at η1 (and therefore
she has no access to Alice’s information), she can gain little information. Eve’s attack might
15
FIG. 8: (colour online) Holevo bounds and mutual information, plotted against η2, for
η4 = −7dB and  = 10−2. The full line indicate that the complementary input at η2 is a
vacuum state; the dashed-dotted line, that Ve = 2SNU . Eve gains no more information by
inputting a non-vacuum state; in fact, she fares worse. By contrast, the mutual
information is only marginally reduced. The dashed line illustrates a channel excess noise
 = 1SNU ; as we expect, I(A : B) and χ(B : E) suffer from a higher excess noise, but not
χ(A : E) as neither Alice nor Eve are concerned with the thermal noise channel.
be construed as a jamming attack; she is detected prior to reconciliation, can construct no
key, but she can prevent Alice and Bob from building key.
Although we have included thermal channel noise, we have so far neglected the issue of
preparation noise and of detector noise. We note that any preparation noise from the source
is thermal, and so a part of the thermal state input at η1, therefore affects both Alice and
Bob (and Eve).
Detector noise, on the other hand, affects Alice and Bob individually and independently.
Adding detector noise to Alice’s and Bob’s signal yields Va = V
pure
a +Na and Vb = V
pure
b +Nb.
We assume that Eve has no detector noise. Figures 6, 7 and 8 were plotted for detector noise
at the mandatory unit of shot noise, Na = Nb = 1SNU . Detector noise will prevent Alice
16
FIG. 9: (colour online) Effects of the detector noise on χ(B : E) and K(A : B||E),
η4 = −7dB and  = 10−2. The full lines indicates that the detector noise at Alice and
Bob’s detectors, respectively Na and Nb, are 1SNU . The dashed lines show such noise at
5SNU . The secret key rate suffers from detector noise, but so does χ(B : E). The x-axis is
cropped for readability.
and Bob from detecting their correlations, but will not increase the correlations between
Alice (Bob) and Eve. Therefore, it reduces the secret key rate, but also the Holevo bounds
χ(A : E) and χ(B : E), as illustrated on Figure 9. Although the key rate remains positive,
detector noise is the greatest threat to it.
There remains to be had perhaps, a discussion about distance. This issue is a subtle
one. Bunched pairs (and quantum correlations) survive astronomical distances; in fact, they
only vanish upon measurement. However, the correlations themselves will disappear if the
photons are detected outside the coherence time. This means that the distance between η1
and either Alice or Bob itself is not important; however, the path from η1 to Alice and from
η1 to Bob should be of more or less equal length, i.e within the coherence time of the source.
This of course, places restrictions on Eve’s attack, such as we have already described.
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A central broadcast scheme is attractive because the source need not be controlled to
the extent of a point-to-point scheme, and two parties can negotiate a key based on their
correlated local noise. This leads to a number of potential applications for key exchange in a
microwave system, such as long distance satellite communications and for example, between
mobile phones in a mobile network, mass synchronisation of secure keys within an office
space connected to a WiFi node, or even key synchronisation between a mobile phone and
an implanted medical device.
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Full results
On the output of η2, the submatrices are as follows
γa =
 µ21V xs + η1 0
0 µ21V
p
s + η1
 ,
γb =
 η2(η1V xs + µ21) + µ22V xe 0
0 η2(η1V
p
s + µ
2
1) + µ
2
2V
p
e
 ,
γe =
 µ22(η1V xs + µ21) + η2V xe 0
0 µ22(η1V
p
s + µ
2
1) + η2V
p
e
 ,
γea =
 µ1√η1µ2(V xs − 1) 0
0 µ1
√
η1µ2(V
p
s − 1)
 ,
γeb =
 −µ2√η2(η1V xs + µ21 − V xe ) 0
0 −µ2√η2(η1V ps + µ21 − V pe )
 ,
γab =
 −µ1√η1√η2(V xs − 1) 0
0 −µ1√η1√η2(V ps − 1)

On the output of η4, the submatrices are as follows
Γa =
 〈X2a〉 0
0 〈P 2a 〉
 , Γe =
 〈X2e 〉 0
0 〈P 2e 〉
 ,
Γea =
 〈XaXe〉 0
0 〈PaPe〉
 , Γeb = √η4γeb ,
Γev =− µ4γeb , Γab = √η4γab , Γan = −µ4γab
Γb =
 η4 〈X2b 〉+ µ24N 0
0 η4 〈P 2b 〉+ µ24N
 ,
Γn =
 µ24 〈X2b 〉+ η4N 0
0 µ24 〈P 2b 〉+ η4N

Γbn =
 µ4√η4 (N − 〈X2b 〉) 0
0 µ4
√
η4 (N − 〈P 2b 〉)

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